This paper addresses two critiques by Mian and Sufi (2015a, 2015b) that were released in response to the results documented in Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015) . We confirm that none of the results in our previous paper are affected by the issues put forward in these critiques; in particular income overstatement does not drive any of our results. Our analysis shows that the origination of purchase mortgages increased across the whole income distribution during the 2002-2006 housing boom, and did not flow disproportionately to low-income borrowers. In addition, middle-and high-income, as well as middle-and high-credit-score borrowers (not the poor), represent a larger fraction of delinquencies in the crisis relative to earlier periods. The results are inconsistent with the idea that distortions in the origination of credit caused the housing boom and the crisis and are more consistent with an expectations-based view where both home buyers and lenders were buying into increasing housing values and defaulted once prices dropped.
The results presented in Adelino, Schoar and Severino (2015) [A2S2015 henceforth] provide new evidence on the increase in mortgage credit prior to 2007 and the subsequent default crisis. In contrast to some of the prior research and much popular held belief, we show that mortgage originations went up across the income distribution, not disproportionately for the poor. In fact, the majority of purchase mortgages by value were originated for middle class and richer segments of the population even at the peak of the housing boom. In addition, there was no decoupling of credit growth (for purchase mortgages at origination) from income growth as had been previously argued in Mian and Sufi (2009) [MS2009 henceforth] . In particular, debt to income levels (DTI) of purchase mortgages did not disproportionately increase for the poorer part of the income distribution relative to other borrowers. Getting this fact right is very important, since the findings in MS2009 have been used to argue that distortions in the supply of credit caused the run up in house prices and the subsequent financial crisis. Shedding further doubt on this interpretation, we show in A2S2015 that the share of defaults stemming from middle-and high-income borrowers and borrowers with credit scores above 660 (a common subprime threshold) increased significantly during the crisis. In contrast, low income borrowers and those with a credit score below 660 represent a smaller fraction of all delinquencies and foreclosures than in previous years.
1 Defaults by middle-and high-credit-quality borrowers increased in particular in zip codes that saw large house price increases in the pre-crisis period and subsequent drops in prices. These results are most consistent with an expectation-based view of the housing crisis where both home buyers and lenders were buying into the increase in house prices and defaulted when prices dropped, rather than the crisis being the result of distortions in the allocation of credit towards low income and marginal borrowers.
As a reaction to A2S2015, the authors released two documents to challenge our findings. The first, entitled "Fraudulent income overstatement on mortgage applications during the credit expansion of 2002 to 2005" (Mian and Sufi (2015a), MS2015a henceforth), challenges the findings in A2S2015 by arguing that the income provided on HMDA mortgage applications suffers from misreporting and fraud, and that the positive relation between credit and buyer income is a result of this problem. The second paper, "Household Debt and
Defaults from 2000 to 2010: Facts from Credit Bureau Data" (Mian and Sufi (2015b) looks at the distribution of debt and defaults by credit score bins following the analysis in A2S2015. This paper, despite the authors' description of the results, confirms the findings in A2S2015 using credit bureau data instead of mortgage origination and delinquency data that we rely on in our analysis.
In what follows we will discuss the arguments presented in these critiques in turn. First, using buyer income instead of IRS household income is not our central critique of the findings in MS2009. Instead, the analysis in A2S2015 highlights the limitations of using zip codes instead of individuals as the unit of observation: in particular, in MS2009 the authors regress the growth in total mortgage debt for home purchase at the zip code level on the growth in per capita income from the IRS. However, we show in A2S2015 that it is important to decompose the total mortgage origination at the zip code level into the growth in the average size of mortgages (intensive margin) and the growth in the number of mortgages originated in a neighborhood (extensive margin). Given that it is households that take out mortgages, not zip codes, only the former is informative about whether there were distortions in how credit was allocated. The second dimension, the growth in the number of mortgages, captures the increase in the relative pace (or velocity) of mortgage origination but does not speak to whether the debt burden of each individual origination decision changes differentially across zip codes.
In A2S2015 we show that mortgage debt and income growth at origination are strongly positively correlated during the pre-crisis period once we use the appropriate measure of credit growth at the household level.
The relation between individual mortgage size and income growth is always positive, independent of the income measure used (IRS income or buyer income from HMDA). It is the relation between the number of mortgages originated within a zip code (the extensive margin) and the growth in IRS income of the zip code that is negative. This means that originations increased relatively more in neighborhoods with lower income growth, likely driven by an increase in the velocity of buying and selling. This effect, once aggregated up, produces very small changes in the overall distribution of credit across zip codes, because the growth in the number of mortgages in low income (and low income growth) zip codes starts from a very small base. Our results call into question one central piece of evidence that the literature has relied on to argue that there was a shift in the allocation of credit to low income borrowers, and we expand on these points below.
While the above result holds no matter which income measure we use, there is a conceptual reason to verify that this analysis also goes through using the growth in the income of buyers rather than the average household income from the IRS: buyers have historically had much higher income levels than the average resident in a zip code, and IRS income combines the stock of existing residents with the flow of new buyers.
Our previous paper shows that the results on the growth in average mortgage size hold just as strongly when we use buyer income from HMDA, but the negative correlation between income and total mortgage credit disappears, pointing to the fragility of the result in MS2009.
In A2S2015 we also conduct a host of robustness tests to show that income misreporting is not an important driver of this result. This is not to say that income misreporting did not happen. It has been shown in a number of papers that some lenders and borrowers engaged in fraudulent practices (Ben-David, 2011 , Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil, 2014 , Griffin and Maturana, 2014 , Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin, 2015 , Ambrose, Conklin, and Yoshida, 2015 . The central point for the results in A2S2015 is that misreporting cannot explain the estimates we obtain with respect to buyer income growth and mortgage growth, nor does it affect the results on the distribution of originations and delinquencies. We show in particular that the relation between individual leverage and income growth is unchanged when we divide areas by the propensity for income misreporting -those with more subprime lenders, and those with lower levels of originations by the government sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs). The correlation between buyer income growth and growth in mortgage origination is always positive and virtually unchanged if we focus on areas where income misreporting was not prevalent. We also show below that even if we drop zip codes based on measures of the discrepancy between buyer income and per capita income from the IRS (the measures suggested in MS2015a), our results still hold. Finally, the zip codes with the highest difference between HMDA and IRS income represent only a small fraction of mortgages originated in any given year.
By focusing on growth rates rather than the underlying level effects, the discussion in MS2015a misses the central insight in A2S2015 that the bulk of mortgage origination was coming from middle-and high-income households even at the peak of the boom.
One consequence of the claim that credit and income decoupled during the boom has been a focus on the role that low income households played in the crisis. In fact, MS2009 argue that the increase in defaults was "significantly amplified in subprime ZIP codes," defined as those with a high fraction of borrowers with a FICO score below 660. Similarly, in MS2015a the authors present a graph ( Figure VII ) that shows higher shares of all delinquent mortgages coming from zip codes with more subprime borrowers. However, this analysis again suffers from the problem that aggregation at the zip code level misses important dynamics within zip codes. As our paper makes clear, when defaults ballooned, borrowers with low credit scores represented a smaller share of the total volume of delinquencies relative to earlier periods, as did those in low income zip codes. In fact, even in areas where subprime loans were most prevalent (defined as those with a high fraction of loans made by originators on the subprime lender list published by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD), it was borrowers with credit scores above the subprime cutoff (a FICO score of 660) who proportionally increased their defaults the most. As an aside, it is important to understand that zip codes with higher subprime concentration are different on many dimensions, including the fact that house prices dropped more in these areas after the crisis. These results do not square well with an interpretation that emphasizes the role of poor and low credit score borrowers in the crisis, and rather point to the role that house price expectations played in driving credit on the upside and in generating defaults after prices dropped.
These patterns are central for our understanding of the boom and bust. In A2S2015 we argue that the contribution to the overall increase in debt was shared across the distribution of borrowers and that the focus should be, instead, on understanding the drivers of defaults for middle-and high-income borrowers, as well as those with middle-and high-credit-scores, once the crisis hit. We show that dollar weighted defaults after 2007 increased most for borrowers with above median income and those with credit scores above 660 (a common subprime cutoff, used among others in MS2009). The reason for this pattern is intuitive -while default rates are higher for low income and low credit score borrowers, the proportional increase in default rates is more pronounced for borrowers who typically did not default. In their second response to our paper, MS2015b repeat this analysis using credit bureau data and show very similar patterns -first, the paper shows that the contribution to the increase in leverage (including purchase mortgages and all other mortgage-related debt) is shared broadly by borrowers between the first and fourth quintiles of the credit score distribution, fully in line with the findings in Figure 1 and 2 of A2S2015. Then, the authors show that borrowers with the lowest credit scores represent a smaller fraction of overall delinquencies in the crisis than they did before, and the biggest increase in the share of defaults stems from borrowers with credit scores above the subprime cutoff. We discuss below some of the apparent differences between the analysis in A2S2015 and MS2015b, and that the two papers show consistent results despite using very different datasets. Ferreira and Gyourko (2015) who argue that the role of declining house prices and negative equity were key for explaining increased defaults.
The paper proceeds by revisiting the different arguments put forward by MS2015a and MS2015b and our responses to them. In this paper we do not repeat all the analysis put forward in A2S2015. For a description of our original results, we point the reader to our earlier paper.
Data description
The analysis in this paper, as in A2S2015, uses data from three primary sources: the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) mortgage dataset, income data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) at the zip code level, and a 5% random sample of all loans in the Lender Processing Services data (LPS, formerly known as McDash). The HMDA dataset contains the universe of US mortgage applications in each year. The variables of interest for our purposes are the loan amount, the applicant's income, the purpose of the loan (purchase, refinance, or remodel), the action type (granted or denied), the lender identifier, the location of the borrower (state, county, and census tract), and the year of origination. We match census tracts from HMDA to zip codes using the Missouri Census Data Center bridge. This is a many-to-many match, and we rely on population weights to assign tracts to zip codes. 2 We drop zip codes for which census tracts in HMDA cover less than 80% of a zip code's total population. 3 With this restriction, we arrive at 23,385 individual zip codes in the data.
IRS income data is obtained directly from the IRS, and we use the adjusted gross income of households that filed their taxes in a particular year in that zip code. Besides total income and per capita income, we use the number of tax filings in a zip code to construct an estimate of the population in a zip code in each year. 4 We obtain house price indices from Zillow. 5 The zip-code-level house prices are estimated using the median house price for all homes in a zip code as of June of each year. Zillow house prices are available for only 8,619 zip codes in the HMDA sample for this period, representing approximately 70% of the total mortgage origination volume.
To identify subprime loans, we rely on the subprime and manufactured home lender list constructed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for the years between 1993 and 2005. This list includes lenders that specialize in such loans, and they are identified by a combination of features that include the average origination rate, the proportion of loans for refinancing, and the share of loans sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, among others. 6 The data contain lender names, agency codes, and lender identification numbers, and we use these identifiers to match this list to HMDA.
We also use a loan-level data set from LPS that covers approximately 60% of the US mortgage market and contains detailed information on the loan and borrower characteristics for both purchase mortgages and mortgages used to refinance existing debt. This data set is provided by the mortgage servicers, and we use a 5% sample of the data. The LPS data include not only loan characteristics at origination but also the performance of loans after origination, which allows us to look at ex-post delinquency and defaults. One constraint of using the LPS data is that coverage improves over time, so we start the analysis in 2003 when we use this data set.
For descriptive statistics of the datasets, in particular HMDA and LPS, please refer to A2S2015.
Income misreporting
The key point that is disputed by MS2015a stems from the fact that during the period of the housing boom there was widespread misreporting of income, which is purported to contaminate any inference made using the HMDA data. First, and as we mention above, the central points in A2S2015 hold if we use only IRS income. In particular, the conclusions from the decomposition of total mortgage origination into the average mortgage size and the number of mortgages are independent of the measure of income used. These results are presented in Tables 2 and 4 of A2S2015, and we replicate these tables in this paper (Tables 1 and 2 below). We show that the relation between growth in average mortgage size is strongly positively and significantly related to income growth no matter whether we use IRS income as in Table 1 , HMDA income as in Table 2 or both (Table 3) . Additionally, none of the results on the aggregate distribution of origination and delinquencies is impacted by the issue of income misreporting.
However, it is important to understand that even when we use buyer income from HMDA our results cannot be explained by widespread misreporting in this variable. This is not to say that income misreporting was not a concern during the run up to the housing crisis (as we point out above, this has been shown by a number of authors), but simply that it does not impact the estimates we obtain in A2S2015. We conduct a number of tests to show that if we focus only on zip codes where income misreporting was not a significant problem, our results are virtually unchanged. Panel B of Table 2 (Table 4 of A2S2015) breaks out our sample into different quartiles based on the fraction of mortgages in the zip code that are underwritten by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs), as well as the fraction of loans that were originated by subprime lenders based on the list of lenders that the US Department of Housing and Urban Development classifies as subprime (HUD, see Section 2 for details). Loans that were sold to (and then guaranteed by) the GSEs had to conform to higher origination standards than those sold to other entities, and thus were less likely to have unverified applicant income. 7 If misreporting of income were a significant driver of our results on the relation between buyer income and credit growth, then zip codes with a lower fraction of loans sold to the GSEs should exhibit a stronger relation between mortgage growth and buyer income. Similarly, loans originated by subprime lenders were much more likely to have low or no documentation. Again, if the results on mortgage growth and buyer income were driven by misreporting, we would expect zip codes with a higher fraction of subprime lenders to have a stronger correlation of mortgage growth and income.
For both of these measures of income verification we do not find that the coefficients on buyer income vary significantly. In fact, the coefficient on buyer income growth is very similar in magnitude and significance levels across all quartiles of both the GSE origination fraction and the fraction originated by subprime lenders (if anything, the coefficient is smaller for the zip codes with a relatively low fraction of GSE loans).
In Table 4 we conduct additional tests based directly on the measures of income misreporting suggested by
MS2015a. In particular, we start with our whole sample (8,619 zip codes in total with nonmissing house price data from Zillow), but then drop 10% of the sample at a time, starting with the highest deciles, based on: ( is to see to what extent the estimates are affected by dropping the more "problematic" zip codes based on the measures in MS2015a. We show the results using as the dependent variable both the growth in total mortgage origination, as well as the growth in average mortgage size (which, as we discuss above and in A2S2015, is the right measure for assessing whether there were distortions in the allocation of credit during this time period).
Panel A of Table 4 shows that removing zip codes based on the ratio between buyer income and IRS income leaves all point estimates on the buyer income unchanged for both the growth in total mortgage origination and the growth in average mortgage size. Importantly, the estimates are basically unchanged as we reduce the sample (by up to 40%). If misreporting was indeed the reason behind the positive relation between buyer income and mortgage growth, we would expect the point estimates to go to zero when we take out regions that are deemed more problematic, but this is not the case.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the same is not true about the negative relation between growth in IRS household income and total mortgage growth at the zip code level. In fact, the point estimate becomes statistically insignificant when we drop just 10% of the sample, and even smaller as we drop more zip codes.
However, the results on average mortgage growth are very stable and unaffected. This supports our interpretation in A2S2015 that the result on the negative correlation between mortgage origination and income growth is very sensitive to the selection of the sample, and to the specification chosen (in particular,
as we see in Table 1 , without fixed effects this relation becomes positive). Once we use the same unit on both sides of the regression (that is, when we regress average mortgage size on average household income growth), the results are very stable and show no visible distortions in DTI at origination.
Panel C of Table 4 removes zip codes based on the difference in annualized growth rates of buyer income and IRS income during this time period. The effect on total mortgage origination is reduced in magnitude, but is still statistically significant as we reduce the sample by up to 40%. The relation between buyer income growth and the growth in average mortgage size is, again, positive and very stable throughout. Panel D confirms the findings in Panel B, namely that as soon as we remove a small portion of the sample based on the measures suggested in MS2015a, the relation between IRS income growth and total mortgage growth becomes insignificant, and in fact turns positive as we drop additional zip codes. The relation between average mortgage size and IRS income is strong and positive throughout.
Finally, when we look at the potential aggregate impact of income misreporting for the overall distribution of credit along the income distribution, we see that the fraction of mortgage dollars that is most affected is small, even if we assume the full difference between buyer income and IRS household income is driven by income overstatement and not merely a reflection of the fact that home buyers have always had higher income than the average household in a zip code. Figure 1 below shows the ratio of buyer income to IRS income that is also shown in Figure 1 of MS2015a. We then overlay the dollar value of loans that are originated in these areas (the bars in Figure 1 ). The message from this figure is that the fraction of mortgage dollars originated in the areas where overstatement was potentially largest account for about 7% of originations. By only focusing on the relative changes in growth rates rather than the underlying level effects, the discussion in MS15 (as that in MS09) again misses the important share of originations coming from middle-and high-income households.
3.1.

Low correlation between IRS income and HMDA income
MS2015a also appeal to the small correlation between IRS income growth and buyer income growth as evidence that buyer income growth is likely to reflect fraudulent reporting. The results discussed above, however, suggest that this correlation is more likely to simply reflect the fact that home buyers and residents are very different, and that they have very different income dynamics. 8 We show that this has been historically the case and is not a feature solely of the 2002-2006 period. The income of home buyers and that of the average household in a zip code have been vastly different throughout all years for which we have available data (since the 1990's) and there were no allegations that fraud was an important factor in the 1990s. In Table   1 of A2S2015, we showed that the average income of home buyers is almost twice the IRS income of residents in the same area. MS2015a confirm that this gap has existed in the data historically. This suggests that home buyers in a given year are a very different group compared to residents. A report by the Census bureau shows that only 7.4 percent of homeowners move in a given year, indicating that they are a selected sample of the population. 9 Of these 7.4 percent, about 40 percent move across counties, so growth in their IRS income cannot be accounted for in either the old or the new county. The fact that zip codes are a much smaller geographic unit than counties implies that an even larger proportion of movers move across zip codes. These facts mean that the income of residents in a zip code are likely to be a very noisy measure of home buyers in that zip code.
In Table 5 we regress the growth in the income of home buyers on the growth in IRS zip code income for the period from 1998 to 2002, and then for the boom period from 2002 to 2006. In Panel A of Table 5 we use the sample of zip codes with available house prices (Zillow sample) and Panel B of Table 5 uses the full HMDA sample. We see that the correlation between HMDA income and IRS income is similar and statistically significant, although smaller in magnitude (0.1 versus 0.2) in the pre-crisis period relative to the earlier period when we use county fixed effects. As we have argued in A2S2015, there is no convincing economic reason to include county fixed effects in this type of regressions, as we are concerned about the total variation in income, not just variation relative to the county mean. When we exclude county fixed effects, the relation between buyer income and IRS income growth is strong and again very stable in 2002 to 2006 relative to the 1998-2002 period. The regressions using the full HMDA sample confirm these results.
Englewood an Garfield Park
MS2015a experienced much higher default rates relative to earlier years.
There is another reason why these zip codes illustrate the differences in interpretation of the data between A2S2015 and the papers cited above by Mian and Sufi. Even though Englewood and Garfield Park have very low average household income, the average applicant income for purchase mortgages as of 2002 (i.e., before the boom and before income misreporting was considered a problem) was more than three times the income of average residents. By way of illustration, in zip codes 60621 and 60624, IRS income per capita was 20 thousand dollars in 2002 (both in the bottom 10% in the country), while buyers in that year reported 63 and 74 thousand dollars of income, respectively. These examples serve as an illustration of why the average income of residents in a zip code is often a poor proxy for buyer income, and, by extension, of the dynamics of buyer income over time.
Ex post outcomes for zip codes with large differences in buyer versus resident income
MS2015a argue that the discrepancy between the buyer income and the resident (IRS) income must be an indicator of mortgage fraud and income overstatement, since the neighborhoods with a higher discrepancy are the ones that have worse economic performance ex post. They show that these are the neighborhoods with more subprime loans and those who ultimately had higher unemployment and more defaults in the crisis. There is, however, an important omitted variable in this analysis, since neighborhoods that had a larger difference between the income of buyers and that of residents are also those that had stronger house price growth and subsequently had a steeper house price drop. Of course, neighborhoods with large house price drops subsequently suffered large economic losses for a number of reasons, of which income misreporting is one.
To make this point more clearly, we sort zip codes into quartiles based on two characteristics, namely the fraction of loans in a zip code that are originated by subprime lenders (based on the HUD subprime lender list), as well as the house price growth in the zip code between 2002 and 2006. If reported income growth is indeed primarily driven by fraud, the fraction of loans originated by subprime lenders in an area should be an important determinant of observed buyer income growth. Table 6 reports the summary statistics when we cross these two dimensions. The main message from the table is in Panel D, and it shows that the growth in buyer income shows relatively small variation with the fraction of subprime loans in an area (about 1 to 2 percentage point difference between the lowest and highest quartiles in the fraction of subprime loan origination). However, the variation in house price growth is associated very strongly and positively with buyer income growth, even in neighborhoods with low subprime lending. The difference in annualized growth rate in income is between 6 and 9 percentage points.
Neighborhoods with strong increases in house prices subsequently also saw strong declines. As a result, it seems (at a minimum) questionable that mortgage fraud was a primary driver of poor economic performance in these areas. It is more plausible, instead, that the underlying rise and fall in house prices explains first the change in the buyer income and subsequently the poor economic outcomes of the area.
Distribution of delinquency
In the response to our paper, MS2015a produce a graph that shows the share of defaults by zip-code-level FICO score, and it shows that this fraction is highest in neighborhoods with a high fraction of borrowers with low credit scores (or high fraction of subprime borrowers) (see MS2015a, Figure VII) . The authors argue that these results contradict the findings in A2S2015, since we show that middle-and high-income and middle-and high-FICO score individuals accounted for a larger fraction of defaults. As is clear from the figure itself in MS2015a, and the notes to the figure, the notable characteristic of the crisis period is that zip codes with a high fraction of subprime borrowers reduced, rather than increased, their share of overall delinquent mortgages. An additional issue with the figure in MS2015a is that the authors again do not look at individual transactions but aggregate results up to the zip code level, as was the case in MS2009. We show below that even in neighborhoods with high subprime concentration (measured, in our case, by the share of loans originated by subprime lenders), it was middle-and high-income borrowers (and those with credit scores above the subprime cutoff) who dramatically increased their share of overall delinquencies. 11
In Figure 2 below (and Figure 6 of A2S2015), we separate zip codes into the ones with the 50% highest and lowest concentration of subprime loans (i.e., loans originated by lenders on the HUD subprime lender list). In the median zip code in the US about 10% of loans are originated by subprime lenders, and even the top quartile of zip codes have an average of about 26% (Table 6 , Panel C). This means that even for zip codes with a high concentration of subprime lending, the majority of loans are still prime loans, which again highlights that it is misleading to analyze mortgage transactions at the zip code level. We then decompose In Panel B of Figure 2 , we then track the cohorts of borrowers three years out and calculate the dollar value of loans that defaulted within the first three years after origination. We do the same split by prime versus subprime zip codes as above, and again break out the high versus low credit score borrowers. In the 2003 cohort, only 30% of dollar values in default came from borrowers with FICO scores above 660. 20% of these had a FICO score above 660 in subprime zip codes, and 10% had a FICO score above 660 in prime zip codes. This should not be surprising, since we would expect the biggest amount of defaults to stem from low credit score (in particular, those in the subprime range). However, when we repeat the same analysis for the borrowers with a credit score above 660. Out of these 61%, 49% come from borrowers who have a score above 660 in subprime zip codes and 12% are borrowers above 660 in prime zip codes.
These results show that even in areas where subprime loans were most prevalent, it was higher FICO borrowers who contributed most to the increase in defaults. By just comparing the proportion of delinquencies in prime versus subprime zip codes, the results in MS2015a miss where the increase in defaults is coming from.
Credit bureau data analysis (MS2015b)
In the second response to our paper, Mian and Sufi (2015b), written after our paper was made public and widely discussed, the authors repeat much of the analysis that we document about the contribution to the rise in debt and defaults during the house price boom and bust. In that paper, the authors find that it was not the lowest credit score individuals that contributed most to the rise in total debt (Figures 4 and 5 in MS2015b), but rather that the increase was shared broadly by all borrowers up to the 80 th percentile of credit scores.
Similarly, the increase in debt to income ratio is shared by all borrowers. This analysis confirms our central point that the boom in mortgage origination was widely shared, and not concentrated in the poorest or lowest credit score individuals. Importantly, these results are in stark contrast to the message in MS2009 that focuses on the growth in purchase mortgage credit to low credit score (and low income) individuals, and the implications this may have had for house price growth (or, as the authors put it in Mian and Sufi (2014) The second point made in MS2015b refers to the distribution of delinquencies by borrower credit score.
Contrary to the authors' discussion of those results, they are entirely consistent with the previous findings in A2S2015, once the comparison is performed adequately. In fact, the authors show a significant decrease in the share of defaults coming from borrowers in the bottom quintile of credit scores, and an increase in the share coming from borrowers in the top three quintiles. This confirms the patterns shown in A2S2015,
Figures 2-7 that delinquencies become less concentrated in the low income and low credit score individuals, not more. This is a mechanical effect that comes from the relative growth in delinquency rates. As MS2015b
show in their paper, and we show for our data in Table 7 below, the default rates of low credit score individuals is high, and remains higher than those of higher credit score individuals (going from about 9% to 26% between 2005 and 2009 in the MS2015b data). But the proportional increase is much larger at the top (going from about 2% to 8% for quintile 3, and from what appears less than 1% to 4% for quintile 4 in MS2015b). We find similar patterns for purchase mortgage default rates by cohort in our data (Panels A and B of Table 7 ).
The text in Mian and Sufi (2015b) appears to contradict our results, and Section 5.2 in the paper argues that there are important discrepancies. This is simply not the case. First, our paper focuses on delinquencies by cohort of purchase mortgages (which we have always been clear about), and the Mian and Sufi (2015b) results show the stock of delinquencies for all mortgage-related debt. Additionally, we show results by income bins and by FICO scores, whereas MS2015b use vantage scores (a much less frequent measure in the literature).
Despite these differences, the message from both exercises is the same.
The first critique in MS2015b is that LPS under-represents low credit score individuals, which might bias our results relative to the true share of delinquencies by low income or low credit score individuals in the population. There are at least two reasons for this not to be the case. First, a simple under-representation of low credit score borrowers would not affect the changes we observe over time. It might affect the levels (i.e., the share of delinquencies from low credit score borrowers might show up as smaller than it should), but the changes by cohorts would be unaffected, unless the underrepresentation became worse for later cohorts (which there is no evidence of). Second, and more importantly, we show below that the patterns look the same in Figure 3 , Panels A and B, using data from Blackbox Logic and Figure 3 , Panels C and D, for a sample of borrowers from the public Freddie Mac data ( Figure A4 of A2S2015). Blackbox logic is focused specifically on loans backing subprime mortgage backed securities, so it heavily over-represents subprime loans. We obtain the same the results even with these very different sets of borrowers. Finally, Ferreira and Gyourko (2015) also find that the crisis is, in fact, primarily a crisis of prime borrowers using panel data from Dataquick. Therefore, issues with the representativeness of LPS cannot account for the patterns we show in this paper.
MS2015b also argue that using credit scores at the time of origination introduces biases because credit scores might increase endogenously in high house price appreciation areas (leading us to classify low credit quality borrowers as high credit score ones). This may happen because individuals are able to either sell their homes or to obtain lines of credit instead of defaulting. The authors argue that this was particularly severe for low credit score individuals in high house price appreciation areas. This argument is not relevant for our results, and this is clear from the data shown in Table 8 of MS2015b. That table shows that, between 2000 and 2006, there is an increase in the vantage scores for the bottom quintile of individuals by credit score of 30 points in the lowest house price appreciation areas, whereas this increase is 43 points in the highest house price appreciation areas. The difference between the two is 13 points. The "endogenous" increase in credit scores that can be attributed to higher house prices causing high credit scores (which might, then, lead to misclassification of good borrowers as bad borrowers) can account for, at most, 2 to 18 points in the credit score according to this table. This a small change economically that has no material impact on any measurement we perform.
In fact, the increase in vantage scores shown by MS2015b is a result simply of the passage of time, as they use credit scores for borrowers as of 1997. All borrowers in the MS2015b sample below the 80 th percentile experience a 20-40 point increase in credit score, irrespective of the house price increase in their area.
The argument that misclassification of borrowers drives our results is also entirely inconsistent with the data.
If it were, in fact, the case that our results reflected some upward drift in quality of all borrowers, we should see an "emptying out" of the bin of borrowers below a FICO score of 660 in terms of mortgage originations.
That is not what we see. In fact, both by income and by credit score, the share of originations to the low end of either distribution was stable, or experiences small increases, it never drops. The surprising fact we have pointed out in A2S2015 is that the share of delinquencies that these borrowers make up becomes smaller over time, not larger.
Finally, it is worth comparing the fractions of delinquencies shown in A2S2015 and MS2015b directly, since the latter only focuses on level results rather than looking at the changes in shares of total delinquency over the crisis period. 12 In Figure 4 below, we construct quintiles by FICO score, to match the data sorting in MS2015b. 13 This is the same picture shown in Figure 3 of A2S2015, but constructed with quintiles of FICO scores rather than a cutoff of 660 and 720. The patterns are exactly the same: the bottom quintile makes up two-thirds of delinquencies in the 2003 mortgage cohort, but drops to only 36% for the 2006 cohort. The second quintile grows from a share of 18% to 29%, the third increases from 9% to 20%, and the top two increase from a combined fraction of 7% to about 15%. Panel B of Figure 4 shows the results for all mortgage types, instead of just purchase mortgages. The quantities are essentially unchanged.
Even when focusing on the cross section of credit scores, the two analysis are very similar: MS2015b show in Figure 9 that the bottom quintile by credit score represented about 31% of all delinquent mortgage debt as of 2009, the second quintile was at about 33%, the third represented about 20%, the fourth about 9% and the top quintile about 5%. Given the differences between the datasets, these numbers are surprisingly consistent 12 MS2015b measure the stock of delinquencies for all mortgage-related debt, whereas A2S2015 show results primarily by purchase mortgage cohort. As Figure 7 of A2S2015 shows, however, the differences in the shares of delinquencies by income when we include all mortgage types are very small.
13
The cutoffs are as follows: the bottom quintile includes borrowers with a FICO score up to 653, the second quintile those with a score up to 698, the third goes up to 736, the fourth goes to 770, and the fifth includes all borrowers with a credit score above 770.
with those we present with LPS data, in particular for the later cohorts in Figure 4 . This corroborates the insight in A2S2015 that middle-income and credit score borrowers dramatically increased their share of delinquent debt as the crisis progressed relative to earlier cohorts.
Conclusion
In sum, the results presented in this paper confirm that the results in A2S2015 are not driven by "fraudulent income overstatement". We show that there was no decoupling of mortgage growth from income growth at origination over the 2002 to 2006 period once we correctly decompose zip code leverage into the extensive margin (number of loans transacted in a zip code) versus the intensive margin (average loan size). Instead, our results document that mortgage debt at origination grew proportionally across the income distribution, and especially middle-and high-income and borrowers with a FICO score above 660 represented a larger share of defaults once the crisis hit. We also show that the second response to our paper by Mian and Sufi, MS2015b, while written as if the results were contradictory to ours, is entirely consistent with our findings. In addition, these results are hard to reconcile with the earlier view of the crisis that unprecedented levels of lending to low income and low credit score neighborhoods set off the crisis. Table 1 (Table 2 of 1996-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2007-2011 1996-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2007- The Table shows OLS regressions of annualized growth in total mortgage credit, the average mortgage size and the number of mortgages originated at the zip code level on the annualized growth rate of average household income (from the IRS) and the annualized growth rate of average buyer income in the zip code (obtained from HMDA). The data only includes mortgages for home purchase. Columns 3, 6 and 9 also include zip code house price growth from Zillow as a control. Sample includes zip codes with house price data from Zillow. Standard errors are clustered by county (shown in parenthesis). *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This figure shows the fraction of total dollar volume of purchase mortgages originated, as well as the total dollar volume of delinquent mortgages by cohort, split by credit score quintiles (FICO). A mortgage is defined as being delinquent if payments become more than 90 days past due (i.e., 90 days, 120 days or more, in foreclosure or REO) at any point during the three years after origination. Data are from the 5% sample of the LPS dataset and the sample includes zip codes with nonmissing Zillow house price data. Bottom quintile  q2  q3  q4  Top quintile 
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